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Abstract
This paper presents a survey of the use of homotopy methods in game theory. Homo-
topies allow for a robust computation of game-theoretic equilibria and their refinements.
Homotopies are also suitable to compute equilibria that are selected by various selection
theories. We present the relevant techniques underlying homotopy algorithms. We give
detailed expositions of the Lemke-Howson algorithm and the van den Elzen-Talman al-
gorithm to compute Nash equilibria in 2-person games, and the Herings-van den Elzen,
Herings-Peeters, and McKelvey-Palfrey algorithms to compute Nash equilibria in general
n-person games. We explain how the main ideas can be extended to compute equilibria
in extensive form and dynamic games, and how homotopies can be used to compute all
Nash equilibria.
JEL Classification Codes: C62, C63, C72, C73.
Keywords: Homotopy, Equilibrium computation, Non-cooperative games, Nash Equilibrium.
1 Introduction
Economic research in the twentieth century has benefited greatly from the development of
game theoretic tools. Typically, an economic situation is modeled as a game, followed by an
analysis of the outcomes of the game that satisfy a particular solution concept, typically the
one of Nash equilibrium or one of its refinements.
Since the analysis of Nash equilibria is key to the understanding of the situation at hand,
much attention has been given to the development of methods by which Nash equilibria can
be computed. We adhere to the view expressed in Judd (1997) that computational methods
will serve an important role in the further development of economic theory, and in this case
in the progress of game theory.
This survey provides an overview of a great variety of methods for Nash equilibrium com-
putation that have been proposed. Although quite distinct in the specifics of the mathematical
techniques used, all these methods share the property that they are guaranteed to converge
to some Nash equilibrium. We argue that the homotopy idea is common to all these methods,
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and this idea should therefore be considered as the main driving force behind convergence.
The homotopy idea is also extremely helpful in obtaining a thorough understanding of the
methods themselves.
Advantages of the use of homotopy methods include their numerical stability, their po-
tential to be globally rather than only locally convergent, their ability to potentially locate
multiple solutions, and the insight they provide into properties of the solutions. Favorable
by-products are that homotopies can be used for proving existence of an equilibrium and for
the generic oddness of the number of equilibria. Similar to the view of Eaves and Schmedders
(1999) “. . . inevitable and lasting role which homotopy methods will play in both theoretical
and applied economic analysis” we believe in an important role for homotopy methods in
game theory.
The homotopy idea is very simple. It consists of, first, the problem of interest, second
an artificial problem that can easily be solved, and third a continuous transformation of
the easy to solve artificial problem into the problem of interest. The homotopy idea then
consists of solving the easy artificial problem first and then using this solution to solve the
transformations of the easy problem until finally the problem of interest has been solved.
Section 2 explains why a deep mathematical result known as Browder’s fixed point theorem
(Browder, 1960), see also the extension by Mas-Colell (1974), is the fundamental reason that
this approach works under very general assumptions.
We will refer to the easy to solve problem as the starting problem, the problem of interest
as the terminal problem, and the problems created by the continuous transformation as the
intermediate problems. The choice of different starting problems and the choice of different
transformations of the starting problem to the terminal problem, creates different homotopy
algorithms. We will explain all algorithms in these terms.
Our survey consists of two main parts. Part 1 (Sections 5 and 6) are devoted to the
study of bimatrix games, whereas Part 2 (Sections 8, 9, 10, and 11) treats general n-person
games. The reason for this distinction is that the linearity present in bimatrix games makes
it possible to find exact solutions for starting, intermediate and terminal problems, whereas
general n-person games require some approximation method to find solutions.
Section 5 starts with a presentation of what is probably the best-known algorithm for the
computation of Nash equilibria, the one of Lemke and Howson (1964). This algorithm finds a
Nash equilibrium by solving a related linear complementarity problem. An alternative to the
Lemke-Howson algorithm is provided by the algorithm of van den Elzen and Talman (1991),
described in Section 6. The latter algorithm allows for an arbitrarily chosen starting point.
The algorithms of Sections 5 and 6 can be generalized to n-person games. For the Lemke-
Howson procedure, such a generalizations are given in Rosenmu¨ller (1971) and Wilson (1971).
Herings and van den Elzen (2002) extend the algorithm of van den Elzen and Talman (1991)
to the n-person case. A difficulty to compute Nash equilibria in n-person games is posed by
the non-linearity of the terminal problem. This makes it impossible to solve the intermediate
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problems exactly. Herings and van den Elzen (2002) tackle this problem by approximating
the intermediate problems by piecewise linear ones, which can be solved exactly. Section 8
discusses the simplicial techniques that are needed for this approach. Section 9 presents the
algorithm of Herings and Peeters (2001). This algorithm exploits the differentiability present
in game theoretic problems. The techniques needed for this approach come from differential
topology and are presented in detail.
The Herings-van den Elzen and the Herings-Peeters algorithms, as well as the van den
Elzen-Talman algorithm, compute the Nash equilibrium selected by the equilibrium selection
theory of Harsanyi and Selten (1988). Another algorithm with a nice game theoretic interpre-
tation is the one related to the quantal-response equilibrium of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995).
This approach is explained in detail in Section 10. Although McKelvey and Palfrey do not
give an algorithmic interpretation of their theory themselves, the results as presented in this
survey make such an interpretation obvious.
Section 11 provides an overview of other homotopy methods that have been proposed
to compute Nash equilibria. Section 12 discusses how the methods presented in the other
sections can be extended to extensive form games and dynamic games. Section 13 explains
how homotopies can be used to compute all Nash equilibria of a game. Section 14 concludes.
2 Homotopy Methods
In topology, two continuous functions from one topological space to another are called homo-
topic if one can be “continuously deformed” into the other. Such a deformation is called a
homotopy between the two functions. Formally, a homotopy between two continuous functions
f and g from a topological space X to a topological space Y is defined to be a continuous func-
tion H : [0, 1] ×X → Y such that, for all points x in X, H(0, x) = f(x) and H(1, x) = g(x).
If we think of the homotopy-parameter in [0, 1] as “time”, then H describes a “continuous
deformation” of f into g: at time 0 we have the function f , at time 1 we have the function g.
A properly defined homotopy can be used to solve for the zeros of the function g starting
from the zeros of the function f and gradually solve the nearby systems for increasing values
of the homotopy parameter. These types of procedures are called homotopy methods. The
following mathematical result due to Browder (1960) delivers the key insight for why homo-
topy methods converge under very general circumstances.
Theorem 2.1 Let S be a non-empty, compact, convex subset of Rm and let H : [0, 1]×S → S
be a continuous function. Then the set of fixed points, FH = {(λ, s) ∈ [0, 1]×S | s = H(λ, s)}
contains a connected set, F cH , such that ({0} × S) ∩ F
c
H 6= ∅ and ({1} × S) ∩ F
c
H 6= ∅.
The set of fixed points FH of H contains a connected subset F
c
H that intersects the two ex-
tremes: {0} × S and {1} × S. This result suggests the following algorithm. Represent the
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problem for which a solution has to be computed, the terminal problem, as a fixed point
problem, i.e. formulate a function H | {1} × S : {1} × S → S such that a fixed point of H
yields a solution to the terminal problem.1 Formulate the starting problem as a fixed point
problem, an artificial function H | {0} × S : {0} × S → S with usually a unique fixed point,
say s0, that can be computed easily. Define H | (0, 1) × S : (0, 1) × S → S in any way that
makes H continuous on [0, 1]× S. By Theorem 2.1, the point (0, s0) is connected by F cH to a
fixed point (1, s1) of H. Homotopy methods are methods to follow the connected set F cH .
The following result, due to Mas-Colell (1974), shows that Theorem 2.1 can be generalized
to the case of upper hemi-continuous correspondences.
Theorem 2.2 Let S be a non-empty, compact, convex subset of Rm and let H : [0, 1]×S → S
be an upper hemi-continuous correspondence that is non-empty and convex-valued. Then the
set of fixed points, FH = {(λ, s) ∈ [0, 1]× S | s ∈ H(λ, s)} contains a connected set, F
c
H , such
that ({0} × S) ∩ F cH 6= ∅ and ({1} × S) ∩ F
c
H 6= ∅.
Since the fixed point problem related to H is a problem with m + 1 free variables and m
equations, it is usually possible to formulate appropriate regularity conditions for which the
solution is a compact, piecewise differentiable 1-dimensional manifold, i.e. a finite collection
of arcs and loops. The algorithms for bimatrix games in Sections 5 and 6 achieve this by a
nondegeneracy condition. For n-person games, the appropriate regularity conditions are dis-
cussed in detail in Section 9. We will also present methods that work without such regularity
conditions, most notably in Section 8 where we explain how lexicographic pivoting techniques
can be used for the general case.
If the starting problem is constructed to have a unique fixed point, and appropriate reg-
ularity conditions are made, then there is a unique arc, also referred to as path or homotopy
path, from this unique fixed point to a fixed point in {1} × S. At this point it should be
remarked that even if there is a unique arc, it may bend backwards, so under the interpre-
tation of the homotopy parameter t as time, following the homotopy path may involve going
backward in time.
3 Notation
A finite n-person noncooperative game in normal form is a tuple Γ = 〈N, {Si}i∈N , {u
i}i∈N 〉,
whereN = {1, . . . , n} is the finite set of players, Si = {si1, . . . , s
i
mi
} is the finite set of strategies
that player i has at his disposal, and ui is a real valued function on the set of all possible
strategy combinations S = Si∈NS
i. A mixed strategy of player i is a probability distribution
on Si. Thereto we define Σi as the set of all probability distributions over Si. For σi ∈ Σi,
the probability assigned to pure strategy sij is given by σ
i
j . The payoff function is extended
1Here, H |A denotes the restriction of the function H to the domain A.
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multi-linearly to the set of all mixed strategy combinations Σ = Si∈NΣ
i. Given a mixed
strategy combination σ ∈ Σ and a mixed strategy σ¯i ∈ Σi, we denote by (σ−i, σ¯i) the mixed
strategy combination that results from replacing σi by σ¯i. A mixed strategy combination
σ ∈ Σ is said to be a Nash equilibrium of game Γ if σi is a best response against σ−i for all
i ∈ N . The set of Nash equilibria of game Γ is denoted by NE(Γ).
We define the disjoint union of the pure strategies over all players by S∗ =
⋃
i∈N S
i
with m∗ =
∑
i∈N m
i as the cardinality of this set. A subset B∗ of S∗ is called admissible
if B∗ ∩ Si 6= ∅ for all i ∈ N , so an admissible subset B∗ of S∗ contains at least one pure
strategy for each player. We would like to warn the reader that our use of admissible subset
is unrelated to the concept of admissible strategy, which in game theory means a strategy
that is not weakly dominated.
The case n = 2 is referred to as a bimatrix game. A bimatrix game can be represented by a
pair ofm1×m2 matrices (A1, A2), where u1(σ1, σ2) = (σ1)⊤A1σ2 and u2(σ1, σ2) = (σ1)⊤A2σ2.
All vectors in this survey are column vectors. The symbol ⊤ is used for transposition.
The vector ei is the column-vector of length mi for which each element is equal to 1, eij is
the column-vector of length mi for which the jth element is equal to 1 and all other elements
0, and 0i is the column-vector of length mi for which each element is equal to 0. For a matrix
M , we define by Mi · the ith row and by M · j the jth column of the matrix M .
4 Homotopies to Compute Nash Equilibria
In this section we present the homotopies underlying the algorithms of Lemke-Howson (Section
5), van den Elzen-Talman (Section 6), Herings-van den Elzen and Herings-Peeters (Sections
8 and 9), and McKelvey-Palfrey (Section 10). The homotopies underlying the Herings-van
den Elzen and the Herings-Peeters algorithm are identical. These algorithms only differ in
the numerical technique that is used to follow the homotopy path. All the homotopies can
be stated as correspondences from [0, 1] × Σ into Σ. Since all algorithms are designed to
find a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ, all homotopies share the same terminal problem,
H | {1} × Σ is defined as the product of the best response correspondences βi, i ∈ N, in the
game Γ, where βi(σ) = argmaxσ¯i∈Σi u
i(σ−i, σ¯i). Clearly, the set of fixed points of the terminal
problem coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of Γ.
The homotopies also have in common that, for each t ∈ [0, 1), the set of fixed points of
H | {t} × Σ coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of a particular perturbation Γ(t) of Γ.
The correspondence H | {t}×Σ is defined as the product of best response correspondences in
the game Γ(t). The game Γ(0) is chosen to be a game with a unique Nash equilibrium that is
easily computed.
The homotopy H of the previous paragraph is a correspondence. Using the techniques
of Herings (2000) and Geanakoplos (2003), it is possible to define a continuous homotopy
function with exactly the same homotopy path. This is achieved by replacing the best response
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correspondence of player i by a function that assigns to (t, σ) the unique strategy σ¯i that
maximizes the payoff in Γ(t) to player i minus a quadratic term given by the Euclidean
distance to σi. The quadratic term is equal to zero at a fixed point, so fixed points do still
correspond to Nash equilibria of Γ(t).
4.1 The Lemke-Howson algorithm
Let Γ = 〈N, {Si}i∈N , {u
i}i∈N 〉 be a bimatrix game. Let α be a bonus sufficiently large to make
any pure strategy a dominant strategy once this bonus is given for the use of this strategy, for
instance α = maxi,σ u
i(σ)−mini,σ u
i(σ)+ε, where ε > 0. Given such an α and a pure strategy
sij ∈ S
i, we define, for t ∈ [0, 1], the bimatrix game Γ(t) = 〈N, {Si}i∈N , {v
i(t, ·)}i∈N 〉, where
the payoff function vh(t, ·) is defined by vh(t, s) = uh(s)+(1−t)α if sh = sij and v
h(t, s) = uh(s)
otherwise.
The correspondence H : [0, 1] ×Σ→ Σ is defined by
H(t, σ) =
∏
i∈N β
i(t, σ), (1)
where βi(t, σ) = argmaxσi∈Σi v
i(t, σ−i, σi) is the best response correspondence of player i in
game Γ(t). The strategy profile consisting of strategy sij and a best response of the opponent
is, by construction, an equilibrium of the game Γ(0). By gradually increasing t from 0 to 1, the
bonus on sij is gradually decreased from α to 0 where the game of interest is reached. The set
of strategy profiles of the homotopy path coincides precisely with the set of strategy profiles
generated by the Lemke-Howson algorithm. Theorem 2.2 implies that a Nash equilibrium of
Γ(0) is connected to a Nash equilibrium of Γ(1) = Γ.
4.2 The van den Elzen-Talman algorithm
Let ν ∈ Σ be an arbitrarily chosen starting profile. For the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm
one defines a family of subsets Σ(t) of Σ, where Σ(t) = (1 − t){ν} + tΣ for t ∈ [0, 1]. The
set of strategy profiles Σ(t) generates a game Γ(t). By construction, ν is the unique Nash
equilibrium of the game Γ(0).
We define the correspondence H : [0, 1] × Σ→ Σ by
H(t, σ) =
∏
i∈N β
i
Σi(t)(σ), (2)
where βiΣi(t)(σ) = argmaxσi∈Σi(t) u
i(σ−i, σi) is the best response correspondence of player i
in game Γ with restricted set of mixed strategies Σi(t). The set of strategy profiles of the
resulting homotopy path coincides with the set of strategy profiles generated by the van den
Elzen-Talman algorithm. Notice that the starting profile ν affects the homotopy for all values
of t below 1. Theorem 2.2 implies that the unique Nash equilibrium of Γ(0) is connected to
a Nash equilibrium of Γ(1) = Γ.
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4.3 The Herings-van den Elzen algorithm and the Herings-Peeters algo-
rithm
Let p ∈ Σ be a prior belief. For every t ∈ [0, 1], Γ(t) is defined as the game 〈N, {Si}i∈N , {v
i(t)}i∈N 〉,
where the payoff function vi(t) : Σ → R of player i is defined by vi(t, σ) = tui(σ) + (1 −
t)ui(p−i, σi). The game Γ(0) corresponds to a trivial game, where all players believe that
their opponents play with probability 1 according to the prior belief. Any profile of best
responses constitutes a Nash equilibrium of Γ(0). The game Γ(1) coincides with the original
game Γ.
Next, we can define the homotopy correspondence H : [0, 1] × Σ→ Σ by
H(t, σ) =
∏
i∈N β
i(t, σ), (3)
where as before βi(t, σ) is the set of best responses of player i in game Γ(t) against strategy
profile σ−i. The set of strategy profiles of the resulting homotopy path coincides with the set
of strategy profiles numerically followed by the Herings-van den Elzen and the Herings-Peeters
algorithm. This homotopy coincides with the linear tracing procedure as defined by Harsanyi
(1975). Notice that the prior belief p affects the homotopy for all values of t below 1. For
the two-player case, choosing p = ν, (3) and (2) are equivalent in the sense that, for t > 0,
(t, σ) is a fixed point of (3) if and only if (t, (1− t)p+ tσ) is a fixed point of (2). Theorem 2.2
implies that the a Nash equilibrium of Γ(0) is connected to a Nash equilibrium of Γ(1) = Γ.
4.4 The McKelvey-Palfrey algorithm
Another homotopy method related to n person games is derived from the quantal response
theory of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). McKelvey-Palfrey do not give an algorithmic inter-
pretation of their theory themselves, but the results presented in this survey make such an
interpretation obvious.
In the quantal response theory, the payoff to player i when playing pure strategy sij against
a mixed strategy combination σ−i is subject to error and is given by vi(σ−i, sij) = u
i(σ−i, sij)+
εij(t). Here player i’s error vector ε
i(t) is distributed according to a joint distribution with
density function ϕi such that E(εi) = 0. We refer the reader to Section 10 for more details on
quantal response theory.
A particular example concerns the case where ϕi corresponds to the extreme value distri-
bution. In this case, player i has the best-response function defined by
βij(λ, σ) =
exp(λui(σ−i, sij))∑mi
k=1 exp(λu
i(σ−i, sik))
(sij ∈ S
i, i ∈ N).
Here λ is a parameter of the extreme value distribution. Values of λ equal to zero mean that
strategies consists of all error, and errors disappear when λ tends to infinity.
Next, we can define the homotopy correspondence H : [0, 1] × Σ→ Σ by
H(t, σ) =
∏
i∈N{β
i(t, σ)}, (t, σ) ∈ [0, 1) × Σ, (4)
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where βi(t, σ) is the best response function for an extreme value distribution with parameter
t/(1− t), and
H(1, σ) =
∏
i∈N
βi(σ),
the product of best response correspondences in game of interest Γ.
When t = 0, there is a unique fixed point. At the fixed point, every players chooses each
of his pure strategies with equal probability. Theorem 2.2 implies that this fixed point is
connected to a Nash equilibrium of Γ.
4.5 Homotopy continuation
For bimatrix games, the homotopy path is piecewise linear. It is possible to generate the
homotopy path by a finite sequence of complementary pivoting steps. For general n-person
games, the homotopy path has to be traced numerically. There are two fundamental methods
of doing so: simplicial methods and predictor-corrector methods. Simplicial methods exactly
follow approximate solution curves, whereas predictor-corrector methods approximately follow
exact solution curves. For a detailed overview on path-tracking methods the reader is referred
to Garcia and Zangwill (1981) and Allgower and Georg (1990).
The different algorithms mentioned throughout this section use different ways to trace
the path that is determined by the respective homotopy. Table 1 shows for each of these
algorithms the section in which it is explained in detail, the homotopy that is followed, and
the path-following method that is used.
Section Algorithm Homotopy # Players Technique
5 Lemke–Howson Eq. (1) 2 complementary pivoting
6 van den Elzen–Talman Eq. (2) 2 complementary pivoting
8 Herings–van den Elzen Eq. (3) n simplicial
9 Herings–Peeters Eq. (3) n predictor-corrector
10 McKelvey–Palfrey Eq. (4) n predictor-corrector
Table 1: Algorithms described in this survey.
5 Bimatrix Games: The Lemke-Howson Algorithm
Recall that the disjoint union of the pure strategies over all players is denoted by S∗, and
the cardinality of this set by m∗. Any mixed strategy σi is assigned a set of labels in S∗. In
particular, σi is labeled by the pure strategies that are played with probability zero and the
pure strategies of the opponent that are best responses to it:
L1(σ1) = { s1j ∈ S
1 | σ1j = 0 } ∪ { s
2
j ∈ S
2 | (A2· j)
⊤σ1 ≥ (A2· k)
⊤σ1 (s2k ∈ S
2) },
L2(σ2) = { s2j ∈ S
2 | σ2j = 0 } ∪ { s
1
j ∈ S
1 | A1· j σ
2 ≥ A1· k σ
2 (s1k ∈ S
1) }.
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A profile of mixed strategies σ = (σ1, σ2) is labeled by the union of the labels of σ1 and σ2:
L(σ) = L1(σ1) ∪ L2(σ2).
A profile of mixed strategies σ is called completely labeled if L(σ) = S∗ and called sij–almost
completely labeled if L(σ) ∪ {sij} = S
∗. The following result can easily be shown.
Theorem 5.2 A mixed strategy pair (σ1, σ2) ∈ Σ constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the bima-
trix game (A1, A2) if and only if it is completely labeled.
A bimatrix game with the property that any σi ∈ Σi has at most mi labels is called nonde-
generate. For the moment, we will restrict the analysis to the class of nondegenerate games.
Theorem 5.3 In a nondegenerate bimatrix game (A1, A2) only finitely many points in Σ1
have m1 labels and only finitely many points in Σ2 have m2 labels.
It follows as a result of this theorem that in a nondegenerate bimatrix game there are finitely
many points in Σ1 × Σ2 that have m1 + m2 labels. Consequently, there are finitely many
points that are completely labeled and hence finitely many Nash equilibria.
Consider the homotopy as defined in (1). The strategy profile σ ∈ H(t, σ) if and only if σ
is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(t). We argue next that if σ is a fixed point, then L(σ)∪{sij} = S
∗,
so σ is sij-almost completely labeled. Indeed, a pure strategy unequal s
i
j is either played with
probability 0 or is a best response in Γ(t), so certainly a best response in Γ(1). Conversely, if
σ is sij-almost completely labeled, then σ ∈ H(t, σ) for some t ∈ [0, 1]. Also, σ is completely
labeled if and only if σ ∈ H(1, σ).
The algorithm of Lemke and Howson (1964) boils down to following the homotopy-path,
i.e. following a path of sij-almost completely labeled strategy profiles. For nondegenerate
games, the set of points (t, σ) for which σ ∈ H(t, σ) consists of a finite number of piecewise
linear arcs and loops. Each arc has two endpoints, either both being Nash equilibria of Γ, or
one being a Nash equilibrium of Γ and the other of Γ(0). The latter arc corresponds to the
homotopy-path. Loops do not contain any Nash equilibria. It follows immediately that the
number of Nash equilibria of a nondegenerate game is odd.
In a nondegenerate game, player −i has a unique best response to sij, say s
−i
k . The
pure strategy profile (sij, s
−i
k ) is the unique Nash equilibrium of Γ(0), and is s
i
j-almost com-
pletely labeled. Clearly, (sij , s
−i
k ) ∈ H(0, (s
i
j , s
−i
k )), and for sufficiently small values of t,
(sij, s
−i
k ) ∈ H(t, s
i
j , s
i
−k). Either (s
i
j , s
−i
k ) is a Nash equilibrium of Γ, and the homotopy-path
equals the straight line-segment between (0, (sij), s
−i
k ) and (1, (s
i
j , s
−i
k )), or (s
i
j , s
−i
k ) is not a
Nash equilibrium of Γ, and for some value of t < 1, a second pure strategy of player i, say sij′
is a best response against s−ik in game Γ(t). Following the homotopy-path now corresponds to
generating a new line-segment of points (t, σ) with the property that σi puts positive proba-
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bility only on sij and s
i
j′, both pure strategies are best responses in Γ(t) to s
−i
k , and s
−i
k is a
best response in Γ(t) to σi. The algorithm terminates with a Nash equilibrium of Γ as soon
as the value t = 1 is reached.
The algebraic technique that generates the path of sij-almost complete strategy profiles is
known as complementary pivoting. As in linear programming, pivoting refers to the change
of a basis in a linear system of equations that describes a polyhedron. Contrary to linear
programming, the determination of the variable that enters the basis is not determined by
the improvement in the objective function, but by complementarity considerations. For a self-
contained description of complementary pivoting, we refer the reader to von Stengel (2002).
We will illustrate the technique of complementary pivoting in more detail in our exposition
of the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm.
We continue our explanation of the Lemke-Howson algorithm by following its exposition in
Shapley (1974). This exposition consists of a compact and elegant description of the endpoints
of each linear segment in the piecewise linear homotopy-path.
Consider a nondegenerate bimatrix game (A1, A2) and let Gi (for i = 1, 2) be the undi-
rected graph whose vertices are the points from Σi with mi labels, and an additional vertex 0i
having all strategies of player i as label (Li(0i) = Si).2 Any two vertices of Gi are joined by
an edge if they have exactly mi− 1 labels in common (and thus differ in one label precisely).
Let G = G1 ×G2 be the product graph with the vertices being all pairs of vertices of G1
and G2 and the edges being all vertex-edge pairs with vertices coming from G1 and edges from
G2 or vice versa. In line with the definitions above, an edge of G is called sij–almost completely
labeled if the two vertices that are connected by it are sij–almost completely labeled.
A first observation is that for every sij any completely labeled vertex (σ
1, σ2) in G, that is
any Nash equilibrium and the additional vertex (01, 02), is adjacent to exactly one sij–almost
completely labeled vertex (σ˜1, σ˜2). If sij is a label of σ
1, then σ1 is adjacent to σ˜1 in G1
(sharing the same remaining m1 − 1 labels) and σ2 = σ˜2. If sij is a label of σ
2, then σ2 is
adjacent to σ˜2 in G2 (sharing the same remaining m2 − 1 labels) and σ1 = σ˜1. A second
observation is that any sij–almost completely labeled vertex (σ
1, σ2) in G is adjacent to exactly
two sij–almost completely labeled vertices in G. A vertex (σ
1, σ2) in G can only be sij–almost
completely labeled if σ1 and σ2 both have one other label shk in common. One neighbor of
(σ1, σ2) is (σ˜1, σ2) with σ˜1 being a adjacent to σ1 by an shk–almost completely labeled edge in
G1. The other is (σ1, σ˜2) with σ˜2 being a adjacent to σ2 by an shk–almost completely labeled
edge in G2. For the following result, see Lemke and Howson (1964) or Shapley (1974).
Theorem 5.4 Let (A1, A2) be a nondegenerate bimatrix game and sij be a label in S
∗. Then
the set of sij–almost completely labeled vertices and edges in G consists of disjoint arcs and
loops. The end-points of the arcs are the completely labeled vertices (the equilibria of the
2Our explanation of the Lemke-Howson algorithm based on homotopies does not need the additional vertex
0i. The strategy profile (sij , s
−i
k ) in our exposition there, can be used to replace the additional vertex.
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game) and the completely labeled vertex (01, 02) (the artificial equilibrium). The number of
Nash equilibria of the game is odd.
The algorithm of Lemke-Howson starts in the artificial equilibrium (01, 02) that has all labels.
For given label sij a path consisting of s
i
j–almost completely labeled edges and vertices is
followed that terminates at a Nash equilibrium of the game. From a computational point
of view, moving from one almost completely labeled vertex pair to another, is equivalent to
making a linear programming pivot step. We will explain this in more detail for the van den
Elzen-Talman algorithm presented in Section 6.
Essentially, the Lemke-Howson algorithm terminates at an equilibrium because for a given
label s, the set of almost s–almost completely labeled edges is a graph where every vertex has
only one or two neighbors, so this is clearly a collection of paths and cycles. The endpoints
of the paths come in pairs and are the equilibria, including the artificial equilibrium, so the
number of non-artificial equilibria is odd. A vivid image is the “haunted house”, which is a
house with only one entry from the outside and where every room has only one or two doors.
By entering from the outside and subsequently leaving each entered room via the second
door of that room, one will eventually reach a room with only one door only or continues ad
infinitum. The latter cannot happen, since it would imply that the first room visited for the
second time has three doors. The outside entrance corresponds to the artificial equilibrium,
and the rooms with one door to Nash equilibria of interest.
Consider the game of Figure 1. This game possesses a unique Nash equilibrium, the
mixed strategy profile (σ¯1, σ¯2) = ((23 ,
1
3 ), (
3
4 ,
1
4 )). Figure 2 contains the graphs G
1 and G2
s21 s
2
2
s11 2,2 1,4
s12 1,4 4,0
Figure 1: Example.
for this game. The vertices are indicated by the mixed strategies, the labels by the pure
strategies with quotation marks. The path of s11–almost completely labeled vertices and
edges connects the artificial equilibrium (01, 02) via the vertices (s11, 0
2), (s11, s
2
2), (σ¯
1, s22) to
the equilibrium (σ¯1, σ¯2). Our exposition of Lemke-Howson using the homotopy approach
would skip the two artificial vertices (01, 02) and (s11, 0
2), and starts directly with (s11, s
2
2).
In game theory degeneracy is not always a non-generic phenomenon. For instance, for a
normal form representation of a game in extensive form, degeneracy is the rule rather than
the exception, even if the payoffs in the extensive form game are randomly chosen. But also
in other normal form games, representing certain economic situations, degeneracy can easily
occur, simply because payoffs are not randomly chosen but reflect some structure that is
present in the economic model. Lemke and Howson (1964) resolve degeneracy by perturbing
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Figure 2: Example Lemke-Howson.
the game and show that an equilibrium for the perturbed game defines an equilibrium for
the original game. Wilson (1992) amends the Lemke-Howson algorithm to handle degenerate
games by using lexicographic pivoting techniques. The resulting algorithm can be used to
compute a set of simply stable equilibria.3 We will illustrate the use of lexicographic pivoting
techniques in Section 8 when dealing with the Herings-van den Elzen algorithm.
The Lemke-Howson algorithm can be extended to the class of polymatrix games. These
are games where for each player the payoffs are additive over the bilateral interactions with the
other players. Complementary pivoting has been applied to polymatrix games by Yanovskaya
(1968), Howson (1972), Eaves (1973), and Howson and Rosenthal (1974).
6 Bimatrix Games: The van den Elzen-Talman Algorithm
The Lemke-Howson algorithm always starts in a pure strategy profile, where for one player
a pure strategy is randomly chosen, and the other player uses a best response. Van den
Elzen and Talman (1991) developed an algorithm similar to the Lemke-Howson algorithm
that allows for an arbitrary mixed strategy profile as the starting point. In von Stengel, van
den Elzen, and Talman (2002) it has been shown that the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm
is equivalent to Lemke’s algorithm (Lemke, 1965) for a specific auxiliary vector.
The advantage of an arbitrary starting point is twofold. First, often some reasonable guess
of the strategies that should be played in an equilibrium is available. Then it is natural to
take as a starting point of the algorithm a strategy that puts only weight on such strategies.
Secondly, if there is an interest in detecting whether a given game has multiple Nash equilibria,
or there is a desire to compute several Nash equilibria if there exist multiple ones, the flexibility
of the starting point is a desirable feature. We would like to stress that the analysis that follows
can be adapted in a straightforward way to the Lemke-Howson algorithm.
Recall that a subset B∗ of S∗ is called admissible if B∗ ∩ Si 6= ∅ for all i ∈ N , so an
3A set of equilibria is called stable if every game nearby has equilibria nearby. Simple stability results
if the perturbations are not arbitrary but are restricted to certain systematic ways that are easily captured
computationally.
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admissible subset B∗ of S∗ contains at least one pure strategy for each player. Let a starting
point ν ∈ Σ be given. Then σ ∈ H(t, σ) for the homotopy defined in (2) if and only if there
is an admissible subset B∗ of S∗ and vectors τ i, λi ∈ Rm
i
+ , and µ
i ∈ R such that
σij = (1− t)ν
i
j + τ
i
j (s
i
j ∈ S
∗)
ui(σ−i, sij) + λ
i
j = µ
i (sij ∈ S
∗)∑
sij∈S
i τ ij = t (i ∈ N)
τ ij = 0 (s
i
j 6∈ B
∗)
λij = 0 (s
i
j ∈ B
∗).
(5)
Suppose (t, σ, τ, λ, µ) is a solution to (5) (notice that not all B∗ admit solutions in general).
The variable µi represents the maximum payoff that player i can get against strategy σ−i.
The pure strategies in B∗ are all best responses. The λij–s corresponding to best responses
are therefore equal to zero. For strategies not in B∗, the corresponding variable τ ij is equal to
zero.
For bimatrix games the system above is linear and the second line of it can be replaced
by
A1j ·σ
2 + λ1j = µ
1 (s1j ∈ S
1)
(σ1)⊤A2· j + λ
2
j = µ
2 (s2j ∈ S
2).
By substitution of the first line of (5) into these new equations we end up with the following
system of 2(m1 +m2 + 1) linear equations and 2(m1 +m2 + 1) + 1 variables.4
A1j ·((1− t)ν
2 +
∑
s2
k
∈B∗τ
2
ke
2
k) + λ
1
j = µ
1 (s1j ∈ S
1)
((1− t)ν1 +
∑
s1
k
∈B∗τ
1
ke
1
k)
⊤A2· j + λ
2
j = µ
2 (s2j ∈ S
2)∑
sij∈S
iτ ij = t (i ∈ N)
τ ij = 0 (s
i
j 6∈ B
∗)
λij = 0 (s
i
j ∈ B
∗).
Or, in matrix-vector notation,
(1− t)

A1ν2
(A2)⊤ν1
1
1
+∑s1k∈B∗ τ1k

01
(A2k ·)
⊤
1
0
+∑s2k∈B∗ τ2k

A1· k
02
0
1

+
∑
s1
k
6∈B∗ λ
1
k

e1k
02
0
0
+∑s2k 6∈B∗ λ2k

01
e2k
0
0
− µ1

e1
02
0
0
− µ2

01
e2
0
0
 =

01
02
1
1
 .
(6)
Given the number of equations and unknowns, for each admissible set B∗ a one-dimensional
solution set is what one expects. Van den Elzen and Talman (1991) define a bimatrix game
4Notice that τ i =
P
si
k
∈B∗ τ
i
ke
i
k and λ
i =
P
si
k
6∈B∗ λ
i
ke
i
k.
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to be nondegenerate if the solution set is 1-dimensional for each admissible set B∗. As usual,
the empty set is considered to have any dimension. This means that for each B∗ the set of
solutions to the corresponding system is an empty set or a compact line segment.
Let B∗ be the set containing for each player i his best response against ν−i. For nonde-
generate games, this best response, and thereby B∗, is uniquely defined. It is easily verified
that t = 0, τ = 0, µi = ui(ν−i, sij) for s
i
j ∈ B
∗, and λij = µ
i−ui(ν−i, sij), s
i
j ∈ S
∗, is a solution
to (6). Notice that λij is strictly positive for s
i
j 6∈ B
∗ and τ ij is strictly positive for s
i
j ∈ B
∗.
The idea is to keep B∗ fixed and to increase t until one of the constraints would get
violated, i.e. one of the λ–s or τ–s would become negative. Since the set of solutions is
a line segment, increasing t leads from the solution just identified, to the other boundary
point of the line segment. From a computational point of view, the operation just described
corresponds to a linear programming pivot step.
If the other boundary point of the line segment corresponds to t = 1, the algorithm stops.
It is easily verified that a solution to (6) with t = 1 yields a Nash equilibrium of the bimatrix
game Γ. Otherwise, we have to adapt the set B∗ such that the procedure can be continued.
For the first line segment generated, the case where τ ij becomes negative for some s
i
j ∈ B
∗
cannot occur. The end-point of the line segment is characterized by λij = 0 for some s
i
j 6∈ B
∗.
In this case sij is added to the set B
∗ and the system of equations (6) is studied for B∗∪{sij}.
The end-point of the previous line segment is the starting point of the line segment of solutions
to (6) for B∗ ∪ {sij}. The end-point of this line segment satisfies either t = 1, in which case
a Nash equilibrium has been found, or τ i
′
j′ = 0 for some s
i′
j′ ∈ B
∗ ∪ {sij}, in which case a new
admissible set is defined as B∗ ∪ {sij} \ {s
i′
j′}, or λ
i′
j′ = 0 for some s
i′
j′ 6∈ B
∗ ∪ {sij}, and a new
admissible set is defined as B∗ ∪ {sij} ∪ {s
i′
j′}.
The procedure stops when t is equal to 1. The door-in door-out principle of Lemke and
Howson guarantees that such will be the case after generating a finite number of admissible
sets B∗. Hence starting from a solution corresponding to (t, σ) = (0, ν) by linear programming
steps a piecewise linear path towards a Nash equilibrium is followed.
Theorem 6.1 Let the bimatrix game (A1, A2) and the starting point ν be nondegenerate in
the sense of van den Elzen-Talman. Then the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm terminates
with a Nash equilibrium.
Figure 3 displays the projection on Σ of the path for the game of Figure 1 for initial starting
profile ν = ((45 ,
1
5), (
2
5 ,
3
5)). For player 1 and 2, the pure strategies s
1
2 and s
2
2 are the best
responses against the initial strategy profile ν. Therefore we start tracking the solutions to
the system in (6) for B∗ = {s12, s
2
2} starting at t = 0. We can increase t until t reaches
1
6 ,
the strategy profile σ equals ((23 ,
1
3), (
1
3 ,
2
3)), and λ
2
1 becomes 0. This means that at t =
1
6 the
pure strategy s21 has become a best response for player 2 and we should continue tracking the
system determined by B∗ extended with s21. In the new system for B
∗ = {s12, s
2
1, s
2
2} we can
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keep t at 16 and increase τ
2
1 until τ
2
2 becomes 0 and strategy s
2
2 should be eliminated from
the admissible subset B∗. The strategy profile reached equals σ = ((23 ,
1
3 ), (
1
2 ,
1
2 )). The next
system to solve is therefore determined by B∗ = {s12, s
2
1} and we move in the direction of
(s12, s
2
1) by increasing t, τ
1
2 , and τ
2
1 . At t =
7
12 , σ = ((
1
3 ,
2
3 ), (
3
4 ,
1
4)), λ
1
1 becomes 0 and s
1
1 should
be included in B∗: B∗ = {s11, s
1
2, s
2
1}. Next the path stays at t =
7
12 and τ
1
1 is increased.
We can increase τ11 until τ
1
1 =
1
3 (and τ
1
2 =
1
4) when λ
1
1 gets 0. The strategy profile reached
equals σ = ((13 ,
2
3 ), (
3
4 ,
1
4 )), the Nash equilibrium of the game. We complete the algorithm by
following the path for B∗ = {s11, s
1
2, s
2
1, s
2
2} keeping σ at the equilibrium value, towards t = 1.
s12 s
1
1
s22
s21
•
σ¯
• ν
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
Z
A
A
AA





6
}
-
Figure 3: Example van den Elzen-Talman.
The procedure tracks a piecewise linear path starting at (0, ν) = (0, ((45 ,
1
5 ), (
2
5 ,
3
5))), pro-
ceeding to (16 , ((
2
3 ,
1
3 ), (
1
3 ,
2
3 ))), (
1
6 , ((
2
3 ,
1
3 ), (
1
2 ,
1
2 ))), (
7
12 , ((
1
3 ,
2
3), (
3
4 ,
1
4))), and (
7
12 , ((
2
3 ,
1
3 ), (
3
4 ,
1
4 ))),
and reaching t = 1 with the Nash equilibrium at (1, σ¯) = (1, ((23 ,
1
3), (
3
4 ,
1
4))). Clearly, we could
have terminated the algorithm at t = 712 when we found the Nash equilibrium. More gener-
ally, as soon as a set B∗ = S∗ is reached, a fully mixed Nash equilibrium has been found, and
the algorithm can be stopped.
In van den Elzen and Talman (1999) it is shown that given any prior and a generic
bimatrix game, the paths generated by the linear tracing procedure developed in Harsanyi
(1975) and the pivoting procedure outlined above are the same. The tracing procedure is the
key ingredient in the equilibrium selection method developed in Harsanyi and Selten (1988).
We will explain the linear tracing procedure in more detail in Section 8.
7 From Two to Many Players
The problem of finding a Nash equilibrium in a game with more than two players is equiv-
alent to solving a non-linear complementarity problem. Therefore, complementary pivoting
techniques are not directly applicable. For general n-person games, algorithms to compute
equilibria rely either on simplicial subdivisions for approximating nonlinear homotopies by
piecewise linear ones, or on numerical methods to solve systems of higher-degree polynomial
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inequalities. Methods for the computation of equilibria for noncooperative games with more
than two players are also surveyed in McKelvey and McLennan (1996).
Seminal papers on the computation of Nash equilibria in n-person games are the ones
by Rosenmu¨ller (1971) and Wilson (1971). Both extend the Lemke-Howson procedure to
nondegerenerate n-person games by formulating the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium
as a nonlinear complementarity problem. Both procedures start with fixing a strategy for
(n− 1) players and compute the best response against it for the remaining player. The point
found determines a starting point for the 2-person game that results after unfixing one of the
players from its strategy from which a path towards an equilibrium of this 2-person game
originates. This equilibrium determines the starting point for the next step in the procedure.
The procedures of Rosenmu¨ller and Wilson construct in this way an equilibrium of an n-person
game by successively constructing equilibria of k-person games, where 1 ≤ k ≤ n.
The problem of this procedure is that the paths are no longer linear. To turn this procedure
into a numerical algorithm, a method is needed to follow the non-linear path. Although the
methods of Rosenmu¨ller and Wilson are not directly suitable for computational purposes,
their common result, the existence of a non-linear path leading to an equilibrium, was a very
important step towards an implementable algorithm as developed by Garcia, Lemke, and
Lu¨thi (1973) and van der Laan, Talman, and van der Heijden (1987).
A problem of the algorithms discussed so far is that they calculate only an approximation
of a sample Nash equilibrium. McLennan (2005) shows that the number of Nash equilibria
in normal form games of modest size is huge on average. For instance, the mean number of
Nash equilibria in a game with 4 agents, each having 6 strategies, is estimated to be 2.037.
This number increases rapidly in the number of players and the number of strategies. The
huge number of Nash equilibria of a typical game calls for the development of a theory of
equilibrium selection.
Two methods of equilibrium selection stand out in the game-theoretic literature. The
first one is the equilibrium selection theory developed in Harsanyi and Selten (1988), which
applies to general n-person games. The Herings-van den Elzen and Herings-Peeters algo-
rithms compute the Nash equilibrium that is selected by the linear tracing procedure – an
important construct in this selection theory. The first of these algorithms relies on simplicial
approximations and is explained in detail in Section 8. The other algorithm uses tools from
differential topology and is presented in Section 9.
The second method of equilibrium selection is the quantal response equilibrium of McK-
elvey and Palfrey (1995). The quantal response equilibrium is often applied by experimental-
ists because of its good prediction of human behavior. It incorporates probabilities of making
mistakes into the Nash equilibrium concept. Quantal response equilibrium can be turned into
a theory of equilibrium selection by selecting the equilibrium that is obtained in the limit
when mistake probabilities go to zero. This method relies like the Herings-Peeters algorithm
on differentiability and is presented in Section 10.
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8 n-Person Games: The Herings-van den Elzen Algorithm
8.1 The linear tracing procedure
The linear tracing procedure of Harsanyi (1975) starts from a prior, reflecting the ideas of
any player about the strategy used by the other player, and next players react optimally
thereupon. Then the players observe that their expectations are not met and adjust them
towards observed behavior and again react thereupon. By simultaneously and gradually
adjusting expectations, and reacting optimally against these revised expectations, eventually
an equilibrium is reached.
Consider some n-person game Γ and some prior p ∈ Σ and denote, for every t ∈ [0, 1],
Γ(t) as the game 〈N, {Si}i∈N , {v
i(t)}i∈N 〉, where the payoff function v
i(t) : Σ → R of player
i is defined by
vi(t, σ) = tui(σ) + (1− t)ui(p−i, σi).
The game Γ(0) corresponds to a trivial game, where all players believe that their opponents
play with probability 1 according to the prior belief. The game Γ(1) coincides with the original
game Γ. A best response against a strategy combination σ ∈ Σ in the game Γ(t) corresponds
to a best response against the probability distribution t[σ] + (1 − t)[p] on S in the game Γ.
The latter probability distribution does in general not belong to Σ, since it may be correlated
when there are more than two players.
The set of all Nash equilibria related to the games Γ(t), t ∈ [0, 1], is denoted by
L(Γ, p) =
{
(t, σ) ∈ [0, 1] × Σ
∣∣∣ σ ∈ NE(Γ(t)) }.
Observe that σ ∈ H(t, σ) for the homotopy (3) if and only if (t, σ) ∈ L(Γ, p).
Once the number of pure strategies of each player is fixed, a noncooperative game is
completely determined by the utility functions u, which can be represented by a vector in
R
m∗n, where m∗ equals the sum over i of mi. The standard topology and measure on Rm
∗n
therefore induce a topology and a measure on games. The set of such games is denoted G.
For the following result, see Schanuel, Simon and Zame (1991), Herings (2000) and Herings
and Peeters (2001).
Theorem 8.1 There exists a path in L(Γ, p) connecting a best response against the prior to
a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ. For an open set of games Γ ∈ G and priors p ∈ Σ with full
Lebesgue measure, this path is unique.
The first of part of Theorem 8.1 follows from an immediate application of Theorem 2.2. We
refer the reader to Section 9 for details on the proof of the second part of Theorem 8.1.
The linear tracing procedure links a Nash equilibrium of the game Γ(0) to a Nash equi-
librium of Γ(1). That is, the linear tracing procedure traces the generically unique path in
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L(Γ, p). The interpretation of the linear tracing procedure is that players gradually adjust
their beliefs about the behavior of their opponents by gradually putting less weight to the
initial beliefs, the prior.
Recall that a subset B∗ of S∗ is said to be admissible if B∗ ∩ Si 6= ∅ for all i ∈ N.
Admissible subsets B∗ can be used to decompose L(Γ, p) in subsets L(Γ, p,B∗), where a set
L(Γ, p,B∗) contains those elements of L(Γ, p) where only strategies in B∗ are played with
positive probability. The manifold structure of L(Γ, p,B∗) is analyzed in detail in Section 9.
The set Σ(B∗) = {σ ∈ Σ | ∀sij 6∈ B
∗, σij = 0} is the strategy set consistent with B
∗. The set
Λ(B∗) = {λ ∈ Rm
∗
+ | ∀s
i
j ∈ B
∗, λij = 0} is the set of Lagrange multipliers associated to B
∗. A
point (t, σ) ∈ [0, 1] × Σ(B∗) belongs to L(Γ, p,B∗) if and only if there exists λ ∈ Λ(B∗) and
µ ∈ Rn such that
vi(t, σ−j , sij) + λ
i
j − µ
i = 0 (sij ∈ S
∗). (7)
We denote by v the function with components vi(t, σ−j , sij) for s
i
j ∈ S. The next step is to
turn Theorem 8.1 and equations (7) into an implementable algorithm.
In Herings and van den Elzen (2002) a simplicial algorithm is used to generate a piecewise
linear path that approximates L(Γ, p). For every B∗, they define a piecewise linear approxi-
mation of (7), whose solution approximates L(Γ, p,B∗). Next it is shown that the piecewise
linear solutions paths for varying B∗ can be nicely fitted together, and result in a piecewise
linear path from a solution to the starting problem to an approximate Nash equilibrium of
the terminal problem.
8.2 Piecewise linear approximations
This subsection describes how to construct piecewise linear approximations to the function v.
For k ∈ N, a k-dimensional simplex or k-simplex ς in Rm is defined as the convex hull
of k + 1 affinely independent points x1, . . . , xk+1 of Rm. We write ς = ς(x1, . . . , xk+1) and
call x1, . . . , xk+1 the vertices of ς. A (k − 1)-simplex that is the convex hull of k vertices of
ς(x1, . . . , xk+1) is said to be a facet of ς. The facet τ(x1, . . . , xj−1, xj+1, . . . , xk+1) is called the
facet of ς opposite to the vertex xj. For a non-negative integer k′ less than or equal to k, a
k′-simplex that is the convex hull of k′ + 1 vertices of ς is said to be a k′-face of ς.
A finite collection S of k-simplices is a triangulation of a k-dimensional convex subset T
of Rm if (1) T is the union of all simplices in S and (2) the intersection of any two simplices
in S is either empty or a common face of both. If S is a triangulation of T, and a facet τ of
ς1 ∈ S is a subset of the relative boundary of T, then there is no ς2 ∈ S such that ς2 6= ς1
and τ is a facet of ς2. If τ is not a subset of the relative boundary of T, then there is exactly
one ς2 ∈ Σ such that ς2 6= ς1 and τ is also a facet of ς2. The mesh size of a triangulation S
of T is defined by mesh(S) = max{‖x− y‖∞ | x, y ∈ ς, ς ∈ S}.
It is well-known that full-dimensional affine parts of the relative boundary of a set are
triangulated by the facets of the simplices in a triangulation. More precisely, let S be a
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triangulation of a convex k-dimensional subset T of Rm, and let the (k−1)-dimensional subset
T of the relative boundary of T be such that T is equal to the affine hull of T intersected with
T. Then the collection S given by S = {τ ∈ T | ∃ς ∈ S, τ is a facet of ς} is a triangulation of
T (see Todd (1976), Theorem 2.3). For instance, the set {0}×Σ is triangulated by the facets
of the simplices in a triangulation of [0, 1] × Σ.
An example of a triangulation of [0, 1] × Σ is illustrated in Figure 4 for the case we have
two players each having two pure strategies. For later purposes we give all 3-simplices in the
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t = 0
t = 12
t = 1
Figure 4: A triangulation of [0, 1] × Σ. Only 3-simplices in
co(x3, x5, x6, x12, x14, x15) are depicted. The vertex x1 = (0, (1, 0), (1, 0))
refers to the strategy vector at which both players play their first pure strat-
egy. Similarly, x3, x7, and x9 correspond to (0, (0, 1), (1, 0)), (0, (1, 0), (0, 1)),
and (0, (0, 1), (0, 1)), respectively.
triangulation of Figure 4 in Table 2. In Table 2 only the 3-simplices in [0, 12 ] × Σ are given.
The ones in [12 , 1] × Σ follow by means of a translation. The position in the table is related
to the position of a simplex in the triangulation.
co({x4, x7, x5, x14}) co({x8, x7, x5, x14}) co({x8, x9, x5, x14}) co({x6, x9, x5, x14})
co({x4, x7, x16, x14}) co({x8, x7, x16, x14}) co({x8, x9, x18, x14}) co({x6, x9, x18, x14})
co({x4, x13, x16, x14}) co({x8, x17, x16, x14}) co({x8, x17, x18, x14}) co({x6, x15, x18, x14})
co({x4, x1, x5, x14}) co({x2, x1, x5, x14}) co({x2, x3, x5, x14}) co({x6, x3, x5, x14})
co({x4, x1, x10, x14}) co({x2, x1, x10, x14}) co({x2, x3, x12, x14}) co({x6, x3, x12, x14})
co({x4, x13, x10, x14}) co({x2, x11, x10, x14}) co({x2, x11, x12, x14}) co({x6, x15, x12, x14})
Table 2: All full-dimensional simplices in [0, 12 ]× S.
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A function v¯ : [0, 1] × Σ → Rm
∗
is called a piecewise linear approximation of v with
respect to S if for each vertex xk of any ς(x1, . . . , xm
∗−n+2) ∈ S, v¯(xk) = v(xk) and v¯ is
affine on each simplex of S. Hence, if x ∈ ς(x1, . . . , xm
∗−n+2), so x =
∑m∗−n+2
k=1 αkx
k, αk ≥ 0,
k = 1, . . . ,m∗ − n+ 2,
∑m∗−n+2
k=1 αk = 1, then v¯(x) =
∑m∗−n+2
k=1 αkv¯(x
k).
Let an admissible subset B∗ and a triangulation S of [0, 1] × Σ be given. We denote by
S(B∗) the collection of b-faces of simplices in Σ, where b = |B∗| + 1 − n, that are contained
in [0, 1]×Σ(B∗) and |B∗| denotes the cardinality of B∗. By repeated application of the result
that claims that the relative boundary of a set is triangulated by the facets of a triangulation,
it follows that S(B∗) is a triangulation of [0, 1] × Σ(B∗).
Let a simplex ς(x1, . . . , xb+1) ∈ S(B∗) be given. Consider solutions (α, λ, µ) ∈ Rb+1+ ×
Λ(B∗) × Rn of the following system of equations, a piecewise linear approximation of the
system (7),∑b+1
k=1 αk = 1∑b+1
k=1 αkv
i(xk) +
∑
sij 6∈B
∗ λije
i
j − µ
iei = 0i (i ∈ N).
(8)
Such solutions are called admissible. An admissible solution (α, λ, µ) to (8) corresponds to
an approximate Nash equilibrium σ of Γ(t). Indeed, (t, σ⊤)⊤ =
∑b+1
k=1 αkx
k, strategies in B∗
are best replies for the payoff function v, λij is the payoff gap between strategy s
i
j and a best
reply for player i, and µi is the payoff for player i according to v when he uses a best reply.
Since ς ⊂ [0, 1]×Σ(B∗), strategies that are not a best reply are played with probability zero.
An admissible solution to (8) is said to be degenerate if at least two of the variables αk,
k = 1, . . . , b+ 1, and λij, s
i
j 6∈ B
∗, are equal to zero.
8.3 Complete facets
The Herings-van den Elzen algorithm generates by means of lexicographic pivoting techniques
a piecewise linear path of approximate Nash equilibria in [0, 1]×Σ joining {0}×Σ to {1}×Σ.
The path is such that every (t, σ) on it corresponds to an admissible B∗, a simplex ς ∈ S(B∗),
and an admissible solution (α, λ, µ). The Herings-van den Elzen algorithm specifies in a unique
way how to move from one simplex to another.
For given (B∗, ς), (8) corresponds to a linear system with m∗ + 1 equations and m∗ + 2
variables. If we rule out degeneracies, then a non-empty solution set is a 1-dimensional com-
pact line segment. The end-points of the line segment are either approximate Nash equilibria
for Γ(0) or Γ(1), or yield admissible solutions for a new (B
∗
, ς). Indeed, with degeneracies
ruled out, at an end-point either αk = 0 for exactly one k or λ
i
j = 0 for exactly one s
i
j 6∈ B
∗.
In the first case, the end-point belongs to the facet τ of ς opposite to the vertex xk. If τ
belongs to the relative interior of [0, 1] × Σ(B∗), then there is a unique simplex ς ∈ S(B∗)
such that ς 6= ς, and τ is a facet of ς. The algorithm continues by generating a line-segment
of admissible solutions in ς. If τ belongs to the relative boundary of [0, 1] × Σ(B∗), then
the end-point is either an approximate Nash equilibrium for Γ(0), or an approximate Nash
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equilibrium for Γ(1), or τ ∈ S(B
∗
), with B
∗
a uniquely determined subset of B∗ having one
element less, and the algorithm continues with a line-segment of admissible solutions in τ. If
λij = 0, then also strategy s
i
j is a best reply. The algorithm continues with a line-segment of
admissible solutions in ς, where ς is the unique simplex in S(B∗ ∪ {sij}) having ς as a facet.
We have argued in Section 5 that degeneracy is not always a non-generic phenomenon in
game theory. Degeneracy can be dealt with by exploiting lexicographic pivoting techniques.
We explain next how lexicographic pivoting techniques can be used to extend the ideas of the
previous paragraph to handle degenerate games.
For an admissibleB∗ and a facet τ(x1, . . . , xb) of a simplex in S(B∗), the (m∗+1)×(m∗+1)-
matrix AB∗,τ is defined by
AB∗,τ =

1 · · · 1 0 · · · · · · · · · · · · 0
E1 0 −e1 0
v¯(x1) · · · v¯(xb) 0
. . . 0 0
. . . 0
0 0 En 0 0 −en
 ,
where, for i ∈ N, Ei = [eij ]sij 6∈B∗
and the zeros indicate submatrices with zeros of appropriate
dimension. The matrix AB∗,τ corresponds to the coefficients in (8) when a facet τ of a simplex
ς is considered. Suppose A−1B∗,τ exists. From AB∗,τA
−1
B∗,τ = I
m∗+1 (the (m∗ + 1)-dimensional
identity matrix), it follows that the first column of A−1B∗,τ corresponds to an admissible solution
to (8) for any ς ∈ S(B∗) being the convex hull of τ and some vertex xb+1 ∈ [0, 1] × Σ(B∗),
whenever the first m∗ + 1 − n components of this column are non-negative. No restrictions
are imposed on the last n rows of A−1B∗,τ . In a nondegenerate solution the first m
∗ + 1 − n
components are all strictly positive, since αb+1 = 0 extends the admissible solution for the
facet τ to the simplex ς.
A row vector x ∈ Rm
∗+1 is lexicographically positive if it is not equal to the vector of zeroes
and its first non-zero entry is positive. The matrix A−1B∗,τ is said to be semi-lexicopositive if
each of the first m∗ + 1− n rows is lexicographically positive.
Given a linear system of equations as in (8), one can pivot in a uniquely determined
new column, either of the type (1, v¯(xb+1)) or of the type (0, 0, eij , 0). In the nondegenerate
case such a pivot step determines in a unique way a column out of the first m∗ + 1− n to be
replaced. In degenerate cases it is possible that the leaving column is not uniquely determined.
A semi-lexicographic pivot step is a pivot step where the leaving column is selected in such
a way that the inverse of the resulting matrix AB∗,τ is semi-lexicopositive. Herings and van
den Elzen (2002) show that a semi-lexicographic pivot step determines in all cases a unique
column out of the first m∗ + 1− n to be replaced.
A facet τ of a simplex in S(B∗) is B∗-complete if A−1B∗,τ exists and is semi-lexicopositive.
Theorem 8.2 describes all possible cases that may occur if a B∗-complete facet τ is given and
a semi-lexicographic pivot step with a vector (1, v¯(xb+1)) is made, where xb+1 is a vertex of
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a simplex having τ as a facet opposite to it.
Theorem 8.2 Let (Γ, p,S) and a B∗-complete facet τ of a simplex ς ∈ S(B∗) be given. Then
exactly one of the following cases holds:
1. ς has exactly one other B∗-complete facet τ ,
2. ς is B
∗
-complete for precisely one admissible B
∗
.
Theorem 8.3 describes all possible cases that may occur if a B∗-complete facet τ is given
that is also a simplex belonging to S(B
∗
), where B∗ = B
∗
∪ {sij}, and a semi-lexicographic
pivot step with a vector (0, 0, eij , 0) is made.
Theorem 8.3 Let (Γ, p,S) and a B∗-complete facet τ that belongs to S(B
∗
) for some admis-
sible B
∗
be given. Then exactly one of the following cases holds:
1. τ is B̂∗-complete for precisely one admissible B̂∗ with B̂∗ 6= B∗,
2. precisely one facet υ of τ is B
∗
-complete.
The consideration of B∗-complete facets determines a unique starting point for the algo-
rithm. The admissible subset B∗0 is defined by the set of strategies sij, where j is the largest
integer such that sij is a best reply to the prior p for player i. Notice that |B
∗0| = n. It can be
shown that the facet (vertex) τ = {0} × Σ(B∗0) is B∗0-complete and that there is no other
B∗-complete facet τ in {0} ×Σ. Even in degenerate cases, the semi-lexicographic rules single
out the unique B∗0-complete facet {0} × Σ(B∗0), which serves as a unique starting point of
the algorithm.
Notice that we are now in a position that makes the Lemke-Howson door-in door-out
principle applicable. There is a unique starting point in {0} × Σ, the B∗0-complete facet
{0} × Σ(B∗0). For any B∗-complete facet τ of a simplex in S(B∗), Theorems 8.2 and 8.3
determine another complete facet in a unique way. The finiteness of the number of simplices
guarantees that at some stage a facet that is a subset of {1} × Σ is reached. Such a facet
determines an approximate Nash equilibrium.
8.4 The algorithm
The formal steps of the Herings-van den Elzen algorithm are as follows.
Algorithm Let (Γ, p,S) be given.
Step 0. Let b = 1 and r = 1. Let B∗ = B∗0, τ1 = {0} × Σ(B∗), and let x2 be the unique
vertex of the 1-simplex of S(B∗) containing τ1 as the facet opposite to it.
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Step 1. Let ς be equal to the convex hull of τ r and {xb+1}. Make a semi-lexicographic pivot
step with (1, v¯(xb+1)) into the system of equations (8) corresponding to AB∗,τr , yielding
a unique column k′ of AB∗,τr which has to be replaced. If k
′ ∈ {b+ 1, . . . ,m∗ + 1− n},
then go to Step 3 with si
′
j′ the pure strategy corresponding to column k
′. Otherwise, go
to Step 2.
Step 2. Increase the value of r by 1 and let τ r be the facet of ς opposite xk
′
. If τ r ⊂ {1}×Σ,
then the algorithm terminates with an approximate Nash equilibrium σ∗ of Γ(1) induced
by the admissible solution of (8) corresponding to AB∗,τr . If τ
r ∈ S(B
∗
) for some
admissible B
∗
, then go to Step 4. Otherwise, there is exactly one b-simplex ς of S(B∗)
such that ς 6= ς and τ r is a facet of ς. Go to Step 1 with xb+1 as the unique vertex of ς
opposite τ r.
Step 3. Let the admissible B
∗
be defined by B
∗
= B∗ ∪ {si
′
j′}. There is a unique simplex ς
of S(B
∗
) having ς as a facet. Increase the value of both b and r by 1 and go to Step 1
with xb+1 as the unique vertex of ς opposite ς, B∗ = B
∗
, and τ r = ς.
Step 4. Let ς be equal to τ r. Make a semi-lexicographic pivot step with (0, 0, ei
∗
j∗ , 0) into the
system of equations (8) corresponding to AB∗,τr , where s
i∗
j∗ is such that B
∗
∪{si
∗
j∗} = B
∗.
This yields a unique column k′ of AB∗,τr which has to be replaced. If k
′ ∈ {b+1, . . . ,m∗+
1− n}, then decrease the value of both b and r by 1 and go to Step 3 with si
′
j′ the pure
strategy corresponding to column k′ and B∗ = B
∗
. Otherwise, decrease the value of b
by 1 and go to Step 2 with B∗ = B
∗
.
Theorem 8.2 corresponds to the semi-lexicographic pivot step made in Step 1: Case 1 occurs
if one goes from Step 1 to Step 2, and Case 2 if one goes from Step 1 to Step 3. Theorem 8.3
corresponds to the semi-lexicographic pivot step performed in Step 4: Case 1 happens if one
goes from Step 4 to Step 3, and Case 2 if one goes from Step 4 to Step 2. The algorithm
terminates after a finite number of steps, after having generated a B∗-complete facet τ being
a subset of {1} × Σ(B∗).
Because we are dealing with a non-linear system of equations, we have to study ap-
proximations of Nash equilibria. Our ultimate aim is to compute a ε-Nash equilibrium
of Γ with ε an arbitrarily chosen positive number. For ε ≥ 0, a mixed strategy combi-
nation σ ∈ Σ is called an ε-Nash equilibrium of Γ if, for every i ∈ N, σik > 0 implies
ui(σ−i, sik) ≥ maxsij∈Si
ui(σ−i, sij)− ε. In an ε-Nash equilibrium the loss in payoffs of using a
suboptimal strategy is at most ε. Though the suboptimal strategy itself might be far away
from an optimal strategy, the loss in payoff is small, which makes sense from a game-theoretic
standpoint.
The algorithm generates a piecewise linear approximation of the homotopy path generated
by the linear tracing procedure. For every ε > 0, there is δ > 0 such that a triangulation of
[0, 1] × Σ with mesh size smaller than δ makes the piecewise linear approximation generated
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by the Herings-van den Elzen algorithm within ε-Hausdorff distance from the homotopy path
generated by the tracing procedure and hence terminates with a ε-Nash equilibrium of Γ. If
the latter path is unique, and a sequence of triangulations with decreasing mesh size is taken,
then the generated piecewise linear approximations converge to the tracing procedure path
in the Hausdorff topology.
8.5 An example
In Figure 5 the algorithm is illustrated for the game considered before. The prior p is taken to
be ((12 ,
1
2), (
3
4 ,
1
4)). Since p
2 is part of the Nash equilibrium, both pure strategies of player 1 are
best responses, and this game is degenerate both in the sense of van den Elzen-Talman and in
the sense of Herings-Van den Elzen. We have chosen this prior to illustrate that lexicographic
pivoting techniques overcome degeneracies. Since the game is a bimatrix game, we would in
general recommend to use either the Lemke-Howson or the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm,
rather than the Herings-van den Elzen algorithm.
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Figure 5: The Herings-van den Elzen algorithm in action.
In the example the algorithm generates 13 facets before terminating with an approximate
Nash equilibrium. The 2-dimensional facets generated are shaded in Figure 5. The path
generated by the algorithm is illustrated by the heavily drawn line going from τ1 to τ13. The
dotted line represents L(Γ, p), which for this example consists of one component. It can be
decomposed into six sets L(Γ, p,B∗).
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9 n-Person Games: The Herings-Peeters Algorithm
9.1 Some tools from differential topology
Games with n players possess a nice piecewise differentiable structure that can be exploited
for computational purposes. To prove Theorem 9.3, the theory of regular constraint sets as
presented in Jongen, Jonker and Twilt (1983) can be applied, see also Herings (1997) for a
first application of this theory to economics.
For some r ≥ 1 a subset M of Rm is called a k-dimensional Cr manifold with generalized
boundary (MGB), if for every x¯ ∈ M there exists a Cr diffeomorphism ϕ : U → V , where
U is an open subset of Rm containing x¯ and V is open in Rm, and some integer ℓ(x¯) ≥ 0,
such that ϕ(x¯) = 0 and ϕ(U ∩M) equals {y ∈ V | yl = 0, l = 1, . . . ,m − k, and yl ≥ 0, l =
m − k + 1, . . . ,m − k + ℓ(x¯)}. If for every element x¯ of an MGB M it holds that ℓ(x¯) ≤ 1,
then M is called a manifold with boundary and the set of elements x¯ for which ℓ(x¯) = 1 is
an (k − 1)-dimensional manifold, called the boundary of M .
Let K1 and K2 be two finite index sets and let gk for all k ∈ K
1 and hk for all k ∈ K
2,
be Cr functions defined on some open subset X of Rm. We define
M [g, h] = { x ∈ X | gk(x) = 0, ∀k ∈ K
1, and hk(x) ≥ 0, ∀k ∈ K
2 }.
For x ∈ X we define the set K0(x) = {k ∈ K2 | hk(x) = 0}. If for every x¯ ∈M [g, h] it holds
that
{ ∂xgk(x¯) | k ∈ K
1 } ∪ { ∂xhk(x¯) | k ∈ K
0(x¯) } (9)
is a set of independent vectors, then M [g, h] is called a Cr regular constraint set (RCS). In
Jongen, Jonker and Twilt (1983) it is shown that every Cr RCS is an (m−|K1|)-dimensional
Cr MGB with ℓ(x¯) = |K0(x¯)| for every x¯ ∈M [g, h]. If a set is a k-dimensional manifold with
generalized boundary, then the neighborhood of a point x¯ belonging to that set looks, in a
well-defined sense, like Rk−ℓ(x¯) ×R
ℓ(x¯)
+ .
Let C1 manifolds X, Y, and Z, Z being a subset of Y, an element x¯ of X, and a function
f ∈ C1(X,Y ) be given. The function f is said to intersect Z transversally at x¯ ∈ X, denoted
by f ⊤  Z at x¯, if
f(x¯) 6∈ Z, or f(x¯) ∈ Z and Tf(x¯)Z + ∂f(x¯)(Tx¯X) = Tf(x¯)Y,
where Tx¯X denotes the tangent space of X at x¯. For regular constraint sets, the tangent space
of X at x¯ is easily computed as
Tx¯X = {x ∈ R
m | ∂g(x¯)(x) = 0},
where 0 is an (m− k)-dimensional vector of zeroes with k being the dimension of the tangent
space. The function f is said to intersect Z transversally if f ⊤  Z at every x ∈ X. Transver-
sality of f implies that the inverse image of f has a particularly nice structure.
Theorem 9.1 For k1, k2, k3 ∈ {0} ∪ N, for r ∈ N ∪ {∞}, let a k1-dimensional C1 manifold
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X, a k2-dimensional C1 manifold Y, and a k3-dimensional C1 manifold Z, Z being a subset
of Y, be given, and let the function f ∈ C1(X,Y ) be such that f ⊤  Z. If k1−k2+k3 < 0, then
f−1(Z) = ∅. If f ∈ Cr(X,Y ), f ⊤  Z, and k1 − k2 + k3 ≥ 0, then f−1(Z) is a (k1 − k2 + k3)-
dimensional Cr manifold.
We are now in a position to state the transversality theorem.
Theorem 9.2 For k1, k2, k3 ∈ {0} ∪ N, for r ∈ N ∪ {∞}, let a k1-dimensional Cr manifold
X, a k2-dimensional Cr manifold Y, a k3-dimensional Cr manifold Z being a subset of Y, a
Cr manifold Ω, and a function f ∈ Cr(X × Ω, Y ) be given, with r ≥ max({1, k1 − k2 + k3}).
For every ω ∈ Ω, define a function fω ∈ Cr(X,Y ) by fω(x) = f(x, ω), ∀x ∈ X. Then f ⊤  Z
implies fω ⊤  Z, except for a subset of Ω having Lebesgue measure zero in Ω.
9.2 The manifold structure of the linear tracing procedure
The Herings-Peeters algorithm exploits the manifold structure of the sets L(Γ, p,B∗). They
prove the following result.
Theorem 9.3 For an open set of games Γ ∈ G and priors p ∈ Σ with full Lebesgue measure, for
all admissible subsets B∗ of S∗, the set L(Γ, p,B∗) is a compact 1-dimensional C∞ manifold
with boundary. Moreover, (t, σ) is a boundary point of L(Γ, p,B∗) if and only if either σij = 0
for exactly one sij ∈ B
∗, or exactly one sij 6∈ B
∗ is a best response to σ−i, or t = 0, or t = 1.
A compact 1-dimensional C∞ manifold with boundary consists of finitely many arcs and loops.
Theorem 9.3 therefore guarantees that generically L(Γ, p,B∗) has a simple mathematical
structure, excluding bifurcations, spirals, higher dimensional parts, etc. Theorem 9.3 is the
non-linear equivalent of the compact line segments of the Lemke-Howson, van den Elzen-
Talman, and van den Elzen-Herings algorithms. One difference now is that loops are possible
and, moreover, L(Γ, p,B∗) may contain more than one arc or loop.
We can show L(Γ, p,B∗) to be a C∞ 1-dimensional manifold with boundary, if we can
represent it as a C∞ regular constraint set with index sets K1 and K2, functions gk for
k ∈ K1 holding with equality, and functions hk for k ∈ K
2 holding with weak inequality,
where |K1| = m− 1. Moreover, we have to show that |J0(x¯)| = 1 for every x¯ ∈M [g, h].
A point (t, σ) belongs to L(Γ, p,B∗) if and only if there exists λ ∈ Rm
∗
and µ ∈ Rn such
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that
vi(t, σ−i, sij) + λ
i
j − µ
i = 0 (sij ∈ S
∗)
σij = 0 (s
i
j 6∈ B
∗)
λij = 0 (s
i
j ∈ B
∗)∑
sij∈S
i σij − 1 = 0 (i ∈ N)
σij ≥ 0 (s
i
j ∈ B
∗)
λij ≥ 0 (s
i
j 6∈ B
∗)
t ≥ 0
−t+ 1 ≥ 0.
(10)
The set K1 corresponding to (10) has cardinality 2m∗ + n. This is indeed one less than
the number of free variables, which is equal to 2m∗ + n + 1. Unfortunately, (10) is not a
regular constraint set in general. The set corresponding to (9) may not consist of independent
vectors. Moreover, it is easy to construct examples such that |J0(x¯)| ≥ 2 for some x¯ ∈M [g, h].
Fortunately, such examples can be shown to be exceptional cases. To prove that, a result
known as the transversality theorem comes to rescue, see for instance Mas-Colell (1985).
We apply Theorem 9.2 in the following way. We take as the set of parameters Ω the
set of games and priors. Then we specify three types of regular constraint sets. The first
type consists of all equalities of (10), the second type of all equalities plus one inequality
of (10), and the third type of all equalities plus two inequalities of (10). Thus we obtain
three types of functions f, with variables t, σ, λ, µ, ω, that can be shown to satisfy f ⊤   {0},
and as a consequence fω ⊤   {0} for almost every ω ∈ Ω. Counting the number of equations
and unknowns, using Theorem 9.1, it follows that a function fω of the third type, with two
inequalities, can only be transversal if fω
−1
{0} = ∅. From this we derive the conclusion that,
generically, it is impossible that two inequality constraints are binding at the same time. The
transversality of the first two types of functions leads to the conclusion that, generically, (10)
is a regular constraint set. This concludes the basic steps in the proof of Theorem 9.3.
Using the representation of L(Γ, p,B∗) as a regular constraint set, we also find that a point
(t, σ) is a boundary point of L(Γ, p,B∗) if and only if either σij = 0 for exactly one s
i
j ∈ B
∗ or
exactly one sij 6∈ B
∗ is a best response to σ−i, or t = 0, or t = 1. Moreover, two sets L(Γ, p,B∗)
and L(Γ, p, B¯∗) can only have boundary points in common, since otherwise (10) would have a
solution with two inequality constraints binding at the same time. When there is a common
boundary point, there is an optimal strategy sij that is played with zero probability, with the
two admissible subsets only differing in this strategy: (B∗∪B¯∗)\(B∗∩B¯∗) = {sij}. Moreover,
in each point at most two sets can meet, as we would again obtain a case where (10) has two
inequality constraints binding at the same time. We see that all subsets L(Γ, p,B∗) of L(Γ, p)
are nicely connected. What we have obtained is a full non-linear analogue of the door-in
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door-out principle of Lemke-Howson.
Theorem 9.4 For an open set of games Γ ∈ G and priors p ∈ Σ with full Lebesgue measure,
L(Γ, p) is a compact one-dimensional piecewise C∞ manifold with boundary. All boundary
points of L(Γ, p) are in {0, 1} × Σ. The boundary point in {0} × Σ is unique.
For almost every Γ and p, the set L(Γ, p) consists of a finite number of paths and loops.
Although it is not necessarily the case that these paths and loops are smooth, the number
of non-differentiabilities is finite at most. All paths in L(Γ, p) start and end in {0, 1} × Σ.
Each such path consists of a finite sequence of smooth arcs of the sets L(Γ, p,B∗). A loop
in L(Γ, p) consists either of a finite sequence (at least two) of differentiable arcs in the sets
L(Γ, p,B∗) or is a loop of one set L(Γ, p,B∗).
Since L(Γ, p) consists of finitely many 1-dimensional C∞ manifolds with boundary, it is
possible to use standardized software based on predictor-corrector methods, to approximately
follow each manifold. We refer the interested reader to Allgower and Georg (1990) for a
detailed exposition on predictor-corrector methods.
9.3 Smoothening the linear tracing procedure
It is attractive to avoid switching from one system of equations to the next, and to formulate
one, differentiable, system of equations whose solution corresponds to L(Γ, p). This is the
purpose of the current section.
Define for α ∈ Rm
∗
, differentiable and monotone (and strictly monotone on the domain
where they are non-zero) functions σij(α) and λ
i
j(α) such that σ
i
j(α) ≥ 0, λ
i
j(α) ≥ 0, and
σij(α) · λ
i
j(α) = 0. Next consider the system
vi(t, σ−i(α), sij) + λ
i
j(α)− µ
i = 0 (sij ∈ S
∗)∑
sij∈S
i σij(α)− 1 = 0 (i ∈ N)
t ≥ 0
−t+ 1 ≥ 0.
(11)
For each point (t, α, µ) satisfying the (in)equalities (11), the point (t, σ(α), λ(α), µ) satisfies
the (in)equalities (10) with B∗ = { sij ∈ S
∗ | σij(α) > 0 }.
Let H : [0, 1]×Rm
∗
×Rn → Rm
∗
×Rn be the continuously differentiable homotopy function
defined by
H(t, α, µ) =
(
vi(t, σ−i(α), sij) + λ
i
j(α) − µ
i (sij ∈ S
i, i ∈ N)∑
sij∈S
i σij(α)− 1 (i ∈ N)
)
.
The zeros of this homotopy function describe the linear tracing procedure: (t, α, µ) ∈ H−1({0})
if and only if (t, σ(α)) ∈ L(Γ, p). Starting at the unique point (0, α0, µ0) ∈ H−1({0}) at t = 0
and following the path described by the zeros of H, we end up in a point (1, α˜, µ˜) ∈ H−1({0}).
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This point generates the Nash equilibrium σ(α˜) of Γ selected by the Harsanyi-Selten theory.
Theorem 9.5 For an open set of games Γ ∈ G and priors p ∈ Σ with full Lebesgue measure,
H−1({0}) is a compact 1-dimensional C1 manifold with boundary. All boundary points of
H−1({0}) are in {0, 1} × ×Rm
∗
× Rn. The boundary point in {0} × Rm
∗
× Rn is unique.
The set H−1({0}) consists of finitely many differentiable arcs and loops. All arcs start and
end in {0, 1} × Rm
∗
× Rn. Loops have no points in common with {0, 1} × Rm
∗
× Rn. There is
exactly one arc that starts in {0} × Rm
∗
× Rn and that ends in {1} × Rm
∗
× Rn with a point
(1, α˜, µ˜) that generates the Nash equilibrium selected by the tracing procedure. This arc is a
transformation of the feasible path of the tracing procedure. All other arcs start and end in
{1} ×Rm
∗
×Rn and connect two points inducing Nash equilibria of Γ.
The structure of H−1({0}) is even simpler than the one of L(Γ, p). Not only, like for
L(Γ, p), are complications like bifurcations, spirals, higher dimensional solutions sets, diverg-
ing behavior, etc. excluded. The arcs and loops in H−1({0}) are differentiable everywhere. It
is the transformation of variables that smoothes out the kinks. As a direct consequence, it is
possible to calculate the derivative at each point of the feasible path, which makes it possible
to follow the path by means of differentiable as opposed to simplicial methods. In Herings
and Peeters (2001) we report numerical results using the software-package Hompack, a For-
tran77 program. This program implements three predictor-corrector methods, see Watson,
Billups, and Morgan (1987) for an introduction to Hompack.
9.4 An example
For the game in Figure 1 and as prior the mixed strategy combination p = ((12 ,
1
2), (
1
2 ,
1
2)),
the corresponding set L(Γ, p) is given by
L(Γ, p) = { (t, (s12, s
2
1)) | t ∈ [0,
1
2 ] } ∪ { (
1
2 , ((r, 1 − r), s
2
1)) | r ∈ [0,
5
6 ] }
∪ { (t, ((3t+16t ,
3t−1
6t ), (
2t+1
4t ,
2t−1
4t ))) | t ∈ [
1
2 , 1] }.
At t = 0, for player 1 and player 2 the strategies s12 and s
2
1 respectively are the best responses
against the prior. The first part of the path of L(Γ, p) is therefore determined by L(Γ, p,B∗)
for B∗ = {s12, s
2
1}. As long as t ≤
1
2 the path stays at (s
1
2, s
2
1). At t =
1
2 strategy s
1
1 of player 1
becomes optimal and has to be added to the admissible set B∗ such that the path continues
in L(Γ, p,B∗) for B∗ = {s11, s
1
2, s
2
1}. In this new component, at t =
1
2 the weight on player
1’s strategy s11 is increased until either it gets weight 1 or until player 2’s unused strategy s
2
2
becomes optimal. This latter happens when the weight on strategy s11 reaches the value
5
6 .
The final part of the path is determined by the component L(Γ, p,B∗) with B∗ including all
strategies.
The first plot of Figure 6 shows the values of t, σ and λ along the homotopy path that is
generated by the linear tracing procedure as a function of pathlength. To make the plot more
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clear, only informative values of the variables are depicted. In particular this means that for
each pure strategy sij, either σ
i
j or −λ
i
j is plotted, depending on which one is non-zero. We
see that at two values of τ kinks in the paths occur. These values of τ correspond to the two
points where we had to adapt the admissible subset B∗ in the description above.
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Figure 6: The homotopy path before and after transformation.
The second plot shows the values of t and α as a function of pathlength and therefore cor-
responds to the feasible path of the tracing procedure after application of the transformation
σij(α) = [max{0, α
i
j}]
2 and λij(α) = [max{0,−α
i
j}]
2. From the plot it is seen that the trans-
formation indeed causes the kinks in the path to disappear. At the points where previously
kinks occurred, now the derivatives of all variables with respect to pathlength are equal to
zero, except the variable that passes zero at that point. It is precisely the transformation of
variables that does the trick.
10 n-Person Games: The McKelvey-Palfrey Algorithm
Quantal response equilibria as introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) are statistical
versions of Nash equilibria where each player’s payoff is subject to random error. For a
given specification of the error structure, a quantal response equilibrium is a mixed strategy
combination that is consistent with optimizing behavior subject to that error structure. One
possible interpretation of this is that players make calculation errors according to some random
process when calculating their expected payoffs.
Player i’s payoff when playing pure strategy sij against a mixed strategy combination σ
−i
is subject to an error and is given by
uˆi(σ−i, sij) = u
i(σ−i, sij) + ε
i
j .
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Player i’s error vector εi is distributed according to a joint distribution with density function
ϕi(εi). The marginal distribution of ϕi exists for each εij and E(ε
i) = 0. For any possible
opponents’ mixed strategy combination σ−i, the sij–response set R
i
j is defined as the set of
error vectors that make strategy sij the best response, so
Rij(σ
−i) = { εi | uˆi(σ−i, sij) ≥ uˆ
i(σ−i, sik) for all s
i
k ∈ S
i }.
The probability of choosing pure strategy sij is then given by
πij(σ
−i) =
∫
Rij(σ
−i)
ϕi(εi) dεi.
The function πi is called the statistical reaction function, or the quantal response function and
satisfies the feature that better strategies are more likely to be chosen than worse strategies.
A quantal response equilibrium (QRE) is a mixed strategy combination σ that is consistent
with the error structure:
σij = π
i
j(σ
−i) for all sij ∈ S
i and all i ∈ N .
For the following result, see McKelvey and Palfrey (1995).
Theorem 10.1 For any game Γ and for any density function ϕ, a QRE exists.
For any parameter λ ≥ 0, the logistic quantal response function is defined by
πij(σ
−i) =
exp(λui(σ−i, sij))∑
si
k
∈Si exp(λu
i(σ−i, sik))
and is obtained when ϕi corresponds to the extreme value (or log-Weibull) distribution.
Therefore, if each player uses a logistic quantal response function, the corresponding QRE,
called logit equilibrium, requires that
σij =
exp(λui(σ−i, sij))∑
si
k
∈Si exp(λu
i(σ−i, sik))
for all sij ∈ S
i and all i ∈ N .
The parameter λ is inversely related to the error level. When λ = 0, the choice of the players is
completely determined by the errors which induces all players to play all their pure strategies
with equal probability. When λ approaches infinity, the influence of the error disappears.
The logit equilibrium correspondence L : R+ → Σ is given by
L(λ) =
{
σ ∈ Σ
∣∣∣σij = exp(λui(σ−i, sij))∑
si
k
∈Si exp(λu
i(σ−i, sik))
(sij ∈ S
i, i ∈ N)
}
.
For the following result, see McKelvey and Palfrey (1995).
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Theorem 10.2 When λ approaches infinity, the set of logit equilibria converges to a sub-
set of the set of Nash equilibria. For an open set of games Γ ∈ G with full Lebesgue measure,
the graph of L contains a unique path of logit equilibria that starts at the centroid for λ = 0
and converges to a unique Nash equilibrium as λ goes to infinity.
The latter unique Nash equilibrium is called the limiting logit equilibrium of the game Γ.
This induces a unique selection from the set of Nash equilibria by ‘tracing’ the graph of the
logit equilibrium correspondence beginning at the centroid of the mixed strategy simplex and
continuing for increasing values of λ.
Define the correspondence L˜ from [0, 1] to Σ by
L˜(t) =
{
L( t1−t) if t ∈ [0, 1)
NE(Γ) if t = 1
For the following result, see Herings (2002).
Theorem 10.3 For all games Γ ∈ G the graph of L˜ contains a component containing an
element at t = 0 and at t = 1.
The (homotopy) path of logit equilibria can be traced from the centroid at t = 0 towards the
limiting logit equilibrium at t = 1 using one of the two methods described in the previous two
sections. In Turocy (2005) a technique to efficiently trace the unique branch generated by the
logit equilibrium correspondence by exploiting convergence properties of the logit QRE.
11 n-Person Games: Other Algorithms
Govindan and Wilson (2003) provide a generalization of the Lemke-Howson algorithm to
n-person games. They indicate that one of the implications of the structure theorem of
Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) is that, above each generic ray emanating from the true game
(represented as a point in a Euclidean space), the graph of the equilibrium correspondence is a
1-dimensional manifold.5 Moreover, at sufficient distance from the true game there is a unique
equilibrium. Therefore, starting from a sufficiently distant game along any generic ray, one can
traverse the line segment to the true game, tracing the 1-dimensional manifold of equilibria
along the way, to find an equilibrium of the true game at the terminus. Govindan and Wilson
(2003) propose to trace the manifold using a global Newton method. For bimatrix games
the algorithm jumps linearly from one boundary to another, and corresponds to the Lemke-
Howson algorithm. Govindan and Wilson (2004) iteratively use polymatrix approximations to
increase the speed of their algorithm presented in Govindan and Wilson (2003) by exploiting
the presence of linearities.
5Such a result can also be obtained by applying the tools from differential topology explained in Subsection
9.1.
32
Another notable equilibrium selection method that has a bounded rationality interpre-
tation is the t–solution (Rosenthal, 1989). Voorneveld (2006) showed that for every game
the set of t–solutions constitutes a homotopy path starting at t = 0 and terminating in a
Nash equilibrium at t = 1. A nice feature of this selection theory is that along the homotopy
path players eliminate successively higher levels of never-best replies and eventually play only
rationalizable strategies with positive probability (see Voorneveld (2006)). This path can be
followed using the techniques presented in the next two sections.
Yamamoto (1993) presents a homotopy to compute a proper Nash equilibrium. Yamamoto
makes use of an expanding set to define a homotopy whose homotopy-path connects the cen-
troid of the simplotope to a solution of a stationary point problem that is a Nash equilibrium
of the original game.
12 Extensive Form and Dynamic Games
Since extensive form games can be represented as a normal-form game, in principle it is
possible to apply any of the algorithms of the previous sections. There are two caveats. First,
since the normal-form representation of an extensive form game is non-generic, it becomes
crucial to handle degeneracies appropriately. Second, from a computational point of view, it
might be much more attractive to work with the extensive form representation. Here, we will
restrict ourselves to a brief overview of this important stream of the literature.
Wilson (1972) applied the Lemke-Howson algorithm to a two-person extensive form game.
By making use of the extensive form directly, the developed method never deals with the entire
linear complementary problem, and leads to significant savings in storage.
In the same journal issue, von Stengel (1996) and Koller, Megiddo and von Stengel (1996)
propose algorithms to solve two-person extensive form games: the first for the class of such
games with zero-sum payoff structure, the latter for general payoffs. Both papers study the
sequence form, rather than the normal form, of the extensive form game. The advantage of
the sequence form in comparison to the normal form is that the size of the sequence form
is linear and not exponentially in the size of the game tree. For the resulting problem the
algorithm of Lemke (1965) is applied.
Von Stengel, van den Elzen and Talman (2002) present another algorithm for solving
two-person extensive form games with perfect recall. Just like von Stengel (1996) and Koller,
Megiddo and von Stengel (1996), the sequence form is used rather than the normal form, but
instead of applying Lemke’s algorithm, the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm is used. The
advantages of that method are the potential to find multiple equilibria and to find normal
form perfect equilibria.
McKelvey and Palfrey (1998) extend the logit quantal response equilibrium defined for
normal form games to the logit agent quantal response equilibrium (AQRE) for extensive
form games. In an AQRE, at each information set players choose better strategies with
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higher probabilities than worse strategies. They show that limit points of the logit AQRE
yield a refinement of sequential equilibria for any finite extensive form game, but are not
logically related to other refinement criteria such as the intuitive criterion or trembling hand
perfection.
For stochastic games, homotopy based algorithms have been proposed by Filar and Ragha-
van (1984), Nowak and Raghavan (1993), and Raghavan and Syed (2002). All papers con-
centrate on two-person games with the single-controller property, i.e. only one player has
partial control over the state transitions: the first for discounted games with zero-sum pay-
off structure, the second for discounted games with general payoff structure, the third for
undiscounted games. In all papers a stationary equilibrium is defined as a solution to a lin-
ear complementary problem, where linearity is obtained as a result of the single-controller
property. Subsequently, the Lemke-Howson algorithm is applied to solve for a stationary
equilibrium.
Herings and Peeters (2004) extend the linear tracing procedure to a related procedure
that is suitable for general finite discounted stochastic games. By application of the technique
presented in Section 9, the extension is shown to possess the same geometric properties as the
linear tracing procedure for normal form games. By numerically following the exact homotopy
path, which is shown to be generically unique, an approximation of a stationary equilibrium
results. Since this method allows for an arbitrary starting point, it has the potential to find
multiple stationary equilibria.
13 Computing All Nash Equilibria
For some purposes, an algorithm to compute a single equilibrium may be insufficient. Even
if the algorithm is able to compute an equilibrium that satisfies perfectness or some other
refinement criterion, it cannot be ruled out that there might exist another equilibrium that is
more salient. For some equilibrium selection theories comparison of equilibria is needed, such
as payoff dominance or risk dominance. Moreover, multiple equilibria with different implica-
tions (in the comparative statics) may exist. We therefore have an interest in algorithms to
compute all equilibria.
Homotopy-based algorithms that are developed to solve for all Nash equilibria are de-
veloped in Kostreva and Kinard (1991) and Herings and Peeters (2005). Both methods are
based on the application of numerical techniques to obtain all the solutions to a system of
polynomial equations. Kostreva and Kinard (1991) focuses on solving for polynomial opti-
mization problems in general and bimatrix games in particular. Herings and Peeters (2005)
concentrates on solving n-person noncooperative games for all its Nash equilibria. The pro-
posed method is shown to be globally convergent for an open set of games with full Lebesgue
measure.
In the same issue of this journal, Datta presents an algorithm for the computation of all
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Nash equilibria in generic games. Starting from a specially structured factorizable system the
algorithm uses polyhedral homotopy continuation to solve for the equilibria. The Gro¨bner
basis (that is also used in Herings and Peeters (2005)) is applied to gain more geometric
information about how the solution set varies with the payoff function.
Recent developments in solving systems of polynomial equations are likely to result in
improvements in homotopy methods to compute all Nash equilibria, as well as to new insights
in issues concerning the number of Nash equilibria in a game. For a state-of-the-art account
of research in systems of polynomial equations, as well as an application to game theory, see
Sturmfels (2002).
We have already stressed that even games of modest size may have an enormous number
of Nash equilibria. To compute all Nash equilibria of an arbitrary game of moderate size is
therefore not feasible within reasonable time limits. The problem is alleviated somewhat since
the algorithms described above generate more and more Nash equilibria during their execu-
tion. There is no need to wait for the algorithm to terminate before the first output can be
observed. Furthermore, it is possible to apply parallel computing to speed up computations.
Also, many games coming from economic applications are not arbitrary, but have a par-
ticular structure that may even lead to uniqueness of equilibrium. Instead of an algorithm
that determines all Nash equilibria of the game of interest, the economist may be satisfied
with an answer to the question whether a particular game has a unique equilibrium or not.
Unfortunately, even the much more modest problem of deciding whether a game has a unique
equilibrium or not is NP-complete (Gilboa and Zemel, 1989).
An alternative uniqueness test consists of running the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm for
bimatrix games or the Herings-Peeters algorithm for n-person games for a variety of starting
points. If the algorithm returns the same equilibrium irrespective of the starting point, then,
though perhaps not unique, the equilibrium found has at least a very large basin of attraction.
If, by varying the starting point, a second equilibrium is found, then it is also possible to find
a third one. The reason for this is that homotopy algorithms always terminate in a positively
indexed equilibrium. A homotopy determines a path from the starting point towards one
equilibrium, and connects the remaining equilibria in a pairwise manner. Each connected
pair consist of a positively and a negatively indexed equilibrium. If a second equilibrium is
found, then it is possible to find a third one, by following the path that connects the first
equilibrium to another one.
14 Conclusions
The paper presents an overview of homotopy algorithms as applied to non-cooperative game
theory. Advantages of homotopy algorithms include their numerical stability, their abil-
ity to locate multiple solutions, and the insight they provide in the properties of solutions.
Homotopy algorithms can be implemented easily with the aid of existing, professionally pro-
35
grammed, software.
From an algorithmic point of view, it is useful to distinguish bimatrix games from games
with more than two players. The reason is that the problem of finding a Nash equilibrium
in a bimatrix games is equivalent to solving a linear complementarity problem, whereas the
general problem is equivalent to solving a non-linear complementarity problem, and has to
rely on numerical approximation techniques.
We present two algorithms in detail that are suitable to compute Nash equilibria for
bimatrix games, the Lemke-Howson algorithm and the van den Elzen-Talman algorithm. We
argue that both algorithms are best understood as following a solution path generated by a
homotopy. We also explain how the door-in door-out principle of Lemke-Howson applies to
both algorithms.
For general n-person games, it is usually not possible to compute an equilibrium exactly,
which calls for different methods. We present the two main ideas in detail, one using simplicial
methods, the other predictor-corrector methods. The Herings-van den Elzen algorithm relies
on the simplicial approach, the Herings-Peeters algorithm on the predictor-corrector idea.
Both algorithms converge to an approximate Nash equilibrium for general n-person games.
For both methods we also illustrate how they can be understood as following a solution path
generated by a homotopy. We also explain how the door-in door-out principle of Lemke-
Howson applies to both algorithms. The third method we present to find a Nash equilibrium
of a general n-person game is related to the quantal-response equilibrium of McKelvey and
Palfrey.
Since the number of Nash equilibria of an arbitrary game tends to be enormous (see
McLennan (2005)), we emphasize the importance of computing a Nash equilibrium with a
good game-theoretical underpinning. The algorithms of van den Elzen-Talman, Herings-van
den Elzen, and Herings-Peeters are all related to the equilibrium selection methods of Harsanyi
and Selten. The McKelvey-Palfrey algorithm has an interesting behavioral interpretation.
We have presented an overview of how homotopy methods have been applied to games in
extensive form and to dynamic games, and how homotopy methods can be used to compute
all Nash equilibria of a game. We think that these are still underexplored research areas and
we expect more exciting work to be done in the future.
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